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1.  The Role of Family Firms in the Economy 
Economic activity is shaped by a large number of institutions and factors other than 
the prices set in markets.  Among these institutions, familial and political relationships 
represent important nonmarket forces which impact economic decisions and firm 
strategies.  In this paper, we study how social ties influence the organization and 
performance of firms in South Korea.  Family firms are an important form of economic 
organization (La Porta et al., 1999; Allouche and Amann, 2000).  In the United States, 
35% of the companies in the S&P 500 are substantially owned by families (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003b), and family firms account for 40% of U.S. GDP and 60% of employment.  
Family firms are even more important in other economies, including Canada (Morck, 
Strangeland and Yeung, 2000), Western Europe (Faccio and Lang, 2002) and many 
countries in Asia (Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2002).  In South Korea, as in most 
emerging economies, family firms are not just important but the ubiquitous form of 
business organization.  It is exceptionally rare to find a Korean firm without one of the 
following characteristics: a founder-owner-manager, an heir-owner-manager, multiple 
family members with shared ownership under one family head, or multiple controlling   2
family members in management.  These are all definitions of a family firm as used in the 
family literature. 
Prior research on the influence of family ties on firm performance has been 
inconclusive.  Theoretically, controlling families can extract private benefits through 
excessive compensation of family members, related-party transactions or special 
dividends.  In addition, family firms often appear to pursue goals other than profit 
maximization, for instance when they give top positions in the firm exclusively to family 
members (Casson, 1999; Caselli and Gennaioli, 2003).  Consistent with these 
disadvantages, a number of studies find that continued family ownership is associated 
with poorer financial performance (Morck, Strangeland and Yeung, 2000; Gomez-Mejia, 
Nunez-Nickel and Gutierrez, 2001; Cronquist and Nilsson, 2003; Bertrand et al., 2004.)  
A large part of the poor performance of many family firms appears to reflect the choice 
of family members as successors.  In the U.S., the appointment of a family member as the 
successor CEO destroys on average significant firm value, presumably because family 
successors are selected from a smaller pool of talent (Villalonga and Amit, 2004; Barth, 
Gulbrandsen and Schøne, 2005).  However, if the successor is a woman or if he attended 
a selective college, there is no such decline in performance, indicating that family 
members who had to prove themselves can run family firms as successfully as outsiders 
can (Pérez-González, 2005). 
There are even reasons to believe that family control could be beneficial.  Large 
shareholders have stronger incentives to monitor managers (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), 
and families are particularly effective at mitigating managerial expropriation because 
they typically have substantial business experience (James, 1999).  Perhaps as a result of 
tighter control, U.S. family firms are less diversified than their counterparts (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003a).  Given their interest in intergenerational wealth transfers, families are 
also likely to have longer investment horizons than professional managers (Stein, 1989; 
Harvey, 1999; Xiao et al., 2001.)  Family members might derive more significant 
personal satisfaction from their business, and relatives of family CEOs can use their close 
personal ties to put pressure on poorly performing members (Davis, Schoorman and 
Donaldson, 1997; Kandel and Lazear, 1992).   3
In legal environments that afford only weak protection to minority shareholders, 
families may prefer to have their own members succeed the founder (Ang, Cole and Lin, 
2000; Burkart, Panunzi, Shleifer, 2002).  Family succession is also more attractive in 
these markets because weak capital markets make it more difficult to profitably sell the 
family firm (Bhattacharya and Ravikumar, 2001).  Consistent with arguments that family 
control has its benefits, family firms in the U.S. outperform other firms in the S&P500 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003b), and they enjoy greater availability of credit (Bopaiah, 1998) 
and a lower cost of debt (Anderson, Mansi and Reeb, 2003). 
 
2.  Data 
The dependent variable of interest is ROA, as measured by operating income divided 
by total assets.  The data on ROA come from Korea Information Service, the country’s 
lead credit-rating agency and a data source trusted to be reliable by both the financial 
community and academics.  Summary statistics for ROA and all independent variables 
are presented in Table 1.  
We have collected a comprehensive data set on family structure, changes in family 
leadership, and family involvement in management over time for 2,090 of the largest 
public and private firms in South Korea.  The family data set covers the 1985-2004 
period, during which time South Korea underwent a series of important shocks (from 
military dictatorship to initial democracy to the Asia crisis and opposition government).  
We worked together with a team of 10 undergraduate and graduate RAs during the period 
of June 2004-June 2005.  During that time, data on family structure and individual family 
members’ resumes were collected and cross-checked with over 25 respected Korean data 
sources.  Sources included the Donga Newspaper People Database and the Joongang 
Newspaper People Database, two sources that collect life-long resumes on over 200,000 
Korean citizens.  Such resumes typically include information on the individual’s date of 
birth, place of birth, high school, university, university major, graduate school, entire 
work history, and family relationships.  While these two sources were highly impressive 
in their coverage, there were numerous missing data points.  To maximize the   4
comprehensive nature of our data set, we collected further data and cross-checked all 
observations with over 25 other sources respected in South Korea.  This foremost 
included the Korean Integrated News Database System (KINDS), the Korean version of 
Lexis-Nexis.   
Next, we electronically and manually searched a number of newspapers directly for 
years that were not already covered in the KINDS database.  These newspapers included: 
the Chosun Newspaper (www.chosun.co.kr); the Dong-A Newspaper (www.donga.com); 
the Financial Newspaper (www.fnnews.com); the Hankook Newspaper 
(www.hankooki.com); the Hankyoreh Newspaper (www.hani.co.kr); the Herald Media 
Business Newspaper (www.heraldbiz.com); the Korea Economic Daily Newspaper 
(www.hankyung.com); the Kukmin Daily Newspaper (www.kukminilbo.co.kr); the 
Kyung Hang Newspaper (www.khan.co.kr); Maeil Business Newspaper (www.mk.co.kr); 
the Money Today online newspaper (www.moneytoday.co.kr); the Munhwa Newspaper 
(www.munhwa.com); the Naeil Newspaper (www.naeil.com); the Segye Times 
(www.segye.com); the Seoul Economic Daily Newspaper (economy.hankooki.com); and 
the Seoul Newspaper (www.seoul.co.kr).  In searching these newspapers, we focused on 
wedding announcements and obituaries for valuable information on family structure over 
time. 
Finally, after searching the various newspapers directly, we search other sites as well.  
A leading Korean NGO on corporate governance, the People’s Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy (PSPD), collect data on the very largest of the country’s 
business groups that we used to compare and cross-check with our own data set.  The 
PSPD lists its data at the website www.peoplepower21.org.  We also cross-checked the 
family structure and family work history data with outside data collected from the Korea 
Information Service (www.kisinfo.com), Korea’s leading credit-rating agency.  Finally, 
we also cross-checked our data set with data from Korea’s Data Analysis, Retrieval and 
Transfer System (dart.fss.or.kr), the Korean Annual Book of Listed Companies, and the 
KOSDAQ Annual Book of Listed Companies.  The final database is one that relies not on 
any single source, but on 25 of the most respected sources in Korea.   5
In the process of collecting the data, we selected our preferred coding system.  We 
were first interested in identifying the family or individual that controlled every 
significant business group and independent non-business-group affiliated company.  Next, 
we looked for who was the individual controlling shareholder who had the majority of 
voting rights in each significant business group and independent non-business-group-
affiliated company.  We particularly were focused on coding changes in the identity of 
the control shareholder for each company over time.  With that information in hand, we 
next coded all of the following family relations: wife, son, daughter, mother, father, 
brother, sister, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, grandson, 
grandson’s spouse, granddaughter, granddaughter’s spouse, cousin, cousin’s spouse, 
cousin’s children, niece, niece’s spouse, niece’s children, nephew’s spouse, and nephew’s 
children.  Each individual was coded according to their family relationship to the family 
head.  Every time the identity of a firm’s controlling shareholder changed, we updated the 
longitudinal family data set to reflect each family member’s new relationship to the new 
controlling shareholder (aka family head).  We also kept track of the number of 
generational changes in the controlling shareholder for each firm.  Because a single 
individual in the data set could be related in some way to as many as 8 different business 
group and as many as 31 different controlling shareholders over time, we purposely 
focused on confirm all multiple family connections across the data set.  Finally, every 
individual in the data set was given a unique ID together, and across each individual’s 
row in the data set is her “fixed” set of characteristics for place of birth, high school name, 
university name, university major, graduate school education, and complete work history. 
For the present study, we are focused on a few variable of central interest within the 
literature on family firms.  In particular, we want to know what happens to the firm’s 
profitability when the head of the controlling family chooses to take a senior management 
role in the firm.  Whereas some studies have argued that family managerial involvement 
leads to tunneling and/or performance deterioration due to incompetence, other papers 
have argue that family managers bring valuable firm-specific human capital and carry 
longer-term and thus more beneficial investment horizons.  Therefore, we code an 
indicator variable equal to 1 for every year in which the family head occupies a senior 
management position of i-sa level or above in one of the firms that s/he controls.  The   6
indicator variable is set equal to zero otherwise.  Another key variable of interest is the 
cumulative number of successions that have taken place within the controlling family.  
Whereas some studies have argued that family succession leads to deterioration in the 
quality of human capital (aka the dumb heir hypothesis), it is possible that with each 
generational change the pool of qualified family managers with firm-specific human 
capital actually improves.  Some families have the same head throughout the 1985-2003 
period of observation in this paper, while other families have as many as three changes in 
family head during the same period.  We therefore code a count variable for the 
cumulative number of changes in family head that a given firm has experienced through 
the year of the observation.  As shown in the summary statistics presented in Table 1, this 
variable ranges from 0 to 3 with a mean of 0.20. 
In conjunction with the two main variables of interest above, we are also in the 
process of coding a continuous variable to measure the quality of human capital.  From 
shortly after World War II until the 1990s, South Korea’s universities relied almost 
exclusively for their admissions decisions on a national aptitude test.  Each department in 
each university set a very narrow range of scores for admission to that department.  Also, 
we have examined the data, and the university-department rankings are quite stable over 
the 1973-1985 period.  We are presently collecting admission score information for more 
years and mapping that onto each manager’s and family member’s resume.  In the next 
iteration, we plan to run interaction variables between the two variables of interest and 
this aptitude test variable.  [Note: One challenge has been to decide what to do with 
managers and family members who did not attend university at all.  Another challenge 
has been to decide what to do with the small but nontrivial percentage of managers and 
family members who attended university overseas.]  
For control variables, we include measures for the log of total assets, leverage as 
measured by total liabilities divided by total assets, marketing intensity (advertising 
expenditures divided by sales), and export orientation (export sales divided by total sales).  
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1.  The four variables come from Korea 
Information Service, Korea’s leading credit-rating agency and the most widely-used data 
source by local and foreign academics as well as local and foreign financial analysts.  The   7
four variables cover the years 1985-2003.  [When the Year 2004 financial data become 
available to us, we will extend the sample to 2004.]  Therefore, all models run in this 
paper use all available company-year data points from 1985-2003.  One will notice that 
are a small number of extreme values for ROA and the control variable for leverage.  To 
our knowledge, these are accurate observations and so should not be removed from the 
data set. However, we have confirmed that all results are robust to the exclusion of 28 
extreme values out of the total sample size of 23,069 (those with ROA < -1 and/or 
leverage > 100).  In the specifications described in the next section, we also add firm-
level fixed effects and year fixed effects.   
 
3.  Empirical Approach 
We are interested in studying how the involvement of family members influences the 
performance of firms.  In our empirical models, we relate a firm’s ROA to measures of 
family involvement:  
(1)  jt t ROA t jt jt jt jt μ β β β + + + + = 2 1 0 X F M 
M represents the family-head-in-senior-management variable, F represents the 
cumulative number of changes in family head, X is a vector of firm characteristics 
(including size, leverage, marketing intensity, export orientation, and two alternative 
measures of business group affiliation) and t are year fixed effects.  We also run the 
model with firm fixed effects.  Because one of our main results on the family-head-in-
senior-management variable has two possible interpretations, we go one further step in 
the modeling and look for the possibility of reverse causality.  We will therefore take 
lagged values of the family-head-in-senior-management variable and the ROA variable to 
determine if family heads are turnaround specialists or expropriators. 
   8
4.  Results 
Summary statistics for all the variables of interest are presented in Table 1.  We 
investigated our original sample and found that there were 44 observations that could be 
attributed to financially distressed firms.  These firms were so distressed that they were 
engaged in fire sales, and thus their amounts of profit and leverage were highly distorted.  
We therefore made a decision rule to eliminate these 44 company-year observations out 
of the original 13, 069.  We are left with a few company year observations with high 
negative and positive ROA, in addition to a few with high leverage.  Yet we have 
confirmed that our substantive results are the same with or without these 44 company-
year observations. 
The simple pairwise correlation table is presented in Table 2, and it shows that that 
there is no significant collinearity across the main independent variables.  There is a 
moderately high pairwise correlation between the independent variable for leverage and 
the dependent variable ROA.  Clearly, firms with high leverage have a difficult time 
generating even operating profits.  There is also a moderately higher pairwise correlation 
between one measure of business group affiliation and cumulative turnover in group head.  
For some reason, the largest business groups have more turnover in their family heads, 
and we plan to investigate why that is the case.  Nevertheless, when we later compare the 
effects of family involvement and business group affiliation, it is family involvement that 
is far more significant and robust in explaining ROA. 
The results of our main model are presented in Table 3, and they show two interesting 
results. The first result is that the cumulative number of changes in family head is 
positively associated with ROA.  Even after controlling for both year fixed effects and 
firm-level fixed effects, this result is both economically and statistically significant.  In 
Model 5, with all other variables set equal to zero, the effect of a change in family head is 
associated with a 0.005 higher ROA (p < .05).  This is economically significant, as it 
constitutes nearly 10 percent of the average Korean firm’s level of profitability for every 
cumulative change in group head.  Some firms in the sample had as many as three 
cumulative changes in group head during the 1985-2003 period.  The second interesting   9
result relates to our family-head-in-senior-management variable.  In Model 5, even after 
controlling for both year fixed effects and firm-level fixed effects, this result is both 
economically and statistically significant.  Having a family head in senior management is 
associated with a 0.019 higher ROA (p < .001).  It is interesting to note that this was the 
one variable affected by the removal of the extreme outliers.  As a result of their removal, 
the variable becomes positive.  Among the control variables, leverage is always 
negatively associated with profitability, and the leverage variable is both economically 
and statistically significant.  Size is of little significance, and marketing intensity and 
export orientation have no independent effect of significance.  Business group affiliations 
are surprisingly negative in their association with ROA, no matter whether we use a 
categorical variable for when the firm belongs to a business group consisting of at least 
three firms or we use a continuous measure for the size of the firm’s business group 
affiliate network.  The inclusion or exclusion of those variables also has no substantive 
effect on the main variables of interest, including turnover in family head. 
Next, we examined the source of the positive result for family-head-in-senior-
management.  In the recent corporate governance, even when firms are profitable authors 
seek to test for evidence of theft and expropriation by family shareholders. Therefore, the 
first potential explanation comes from the recent corporate governance literature, in 
which powerful families have in some studies been found to exploit their outsized voting 
rights to expropriate minority investors.  According to that explanation, family heads are 
actively seeking easy opportunities to expropriate outsiders, perhaps through closer 
involvement with the most profitable firms in their empire, and we refer to that 
explanation as the “Expropriator Hypothesis.”  Another potential explanation is that the 
particular family firm runs into a period of low performance for reasons that are 
exogenous, the family head realizes that s/he has an incentive to step in and take 
managerial leadership of the trouble firm, and that the family head eventually succeeds 
more often than not in overseeing a successful turnaround.  We call this explanation the 
“Turnaround Artist Hypothesis.”  We use three initial tests to find support for either the 
“Expropriator Hypothesis” or the “Turnaround Artist Hypothesis.”     10
In the first test, we are primarily interested in finding out whether family heads 
choose to take senior management positions in firms that are already in trouble.  So we 
generate lagged ROA variables to add to our main model.  We generate variables for one-
year-lagged ROA, two-year-lagged ROA, three-year-lagged ROA, four-year-lagged ROA, 
and five-year-lagged ROA.  We include these lagged ROA variables one a time and 
separately in Models 2-6 of Table 4, before ultimately including all of them at the same 
time in Model 7 of Table 4.  What Models 2-4 suggest is that family heads take over 
firms that have been struggling for a period of at least two years.  But then in years four 
and five, the family head as senior manager becomes associated with increased levels of 
firm performance.  By the end of the five-year cycle, the coefficient for family 
management is four times larger than it was with just the recent one-year performance 
included in the model.  Not only is four-year and five-year lagged ROA negatively and 
significantly associated with current year’s ROA, but also the family-head-in-senior-
management is now far more positively associated with ROA.  In fact, as shown in the 
full Model 7 of Table 4, having a family head in senior management is associated with 
a .010 increase in ROA (p < .05), even after controlling for each of the five lagged ROA 
variables together.  Interestingly, the one-year-lagged ROA variable is both positive and 
significantly associated with current-period ROA (β = 0.365, p < .01), whereas the three-
year and four-year-lagged ROA are both negative and significantly associated with 
current period ROA (p < .01).  
Next, we tested for how long it takes for the family head upon taking a senior 
management role to be associated with higher ROA.  For this test, we generated lagged 
variables for the family head being in senior management.  As before, we generated five 
lagged variables: a one-year-lagged family-head-in-senior-management variable; a two-
year-lagged family-head-in-senior-management variable; a three-year-lagged family-
head-in-senior-management variable; a four-year-lagged family-head-in-senior-
management variable; and a five-year-lagged family-head-in-senior-management variable.  
We enter these lagged variables one by one separately into our main model in Table 5, 
before ultimately including all of them together in Model 7 of Table 5.  The results in the 
full Model 7 suggest that the family head comes into an already struggling firm, the firm 
continues to struggle for at least 3-4 years, and then by the current period the family head   11
as senior manager is associated with an upturn in performance. The coefficient on the 
current-period effect of family management on ROA is highly significant, both 
economically and statistically (β = 0.022, p < .01). 
Next, the third and final test is to include the lagged ROA and lagged family-head-in-
senior-management variables together at the same time.  This is the most definitive of the 
three tests, as it include both prior firm performance and the prior role of the family head 
in the model.  The results shown in Table 6 lend additional support to the Turnaround 
Artist Hypothesis.  In the full Model 7, the family head is positive associated with ROA 
two years into the future upon taking over a senior management position in the firm ((β = 
0.014, p < .01).  It should be noted that to do this final test, the sample size decreases by 
two-thirds from its original size.  Therefore, it is also interesting that the family-head-in-
senior-management retains any statistical power after such a large reduction in sample 
size. 
It is worth noting at this point why we believe the variable for cumulative number of 
changes in family head goes away upon the inclusion of all lagged variables. We have 
found that the variable for cumulative number of changes in family head stays large and 
robust through the inclusion of one-year, two-year, and three-year lagged variables.  Then 
upon the inclusion of a four-year-lagged variable, the sample size drops significantly and 
the variable loses its importance.  That is simply because by including the four-year-
lagged variable, we are losing most observations from the 1980s part of our sample. 
It is difficult to construct an expropriation story that explains these results.  The 
family heads would have to target for plundering those firms that are struggling, are 
going to struggling for at least two years or more, and then are possible candidates for 
value improvement or value creation.  If a country has weak rule of law, the literature has 
already shown that family heads are willing to expropriate in ways that can be easily 
discovered.  So for the expropriation story to be true for even this sample, a few unlikely 
conditions would need to be true.  First, the country would need to have strong rule of 
law, because otherwise family heads would find it far more efficient to target successful 
firms or bankrupt firms for expropriation.  Second, the family heads would need to know   12
with great foresight which firms are currently struggling, but are likely to perform far 
better in two to five years.  Third, the family heads would need to find it more 
individually profitable to plunder these firms than to focus on raising their value.  Of 
these three conditions, it is the first and the third conditions that are the most unlikely.  
Korea has long been characterized in the corporate governance literature as having 
relatively weak rule of law among emerging economies.  Furthermore, given the actual 
increase in performance for these turnaround candidates, it does not appears likely that 
plundering would be more profitable than active and honest value creation. 
Nevertheless, we recognize that by studying lagged variables for ROA levels—even 
with the context of a fixed effects specification—we still are left with some possibility of 
endogeneity driving the results.  Therefore, as a further test of the turnaround hypothesis, 
we will next test a series of GMM models to do more definitively with the question of 
endogeneity.  We have done some early tests using the difference-GMM estimator, and 
these early tests have been promising, but we plan to run further robustness checks in the 
coming weeks. 
Still, taken together, these results suggest two intriguing possibilities.  First, changes 
in family head have actually been value-creating among Korean firms.  Given this 
possibility, the next question to ask is whether Korean families have internal governance 
features that allow for value creation.  We will next examine the cause of each change in 
family head to determine whether (a) families push out heads after a long period of poor 
firm performance; or (b) exogenous events such as the family head’s death were 
primarily responsible for better firm performance.  We will also examine what 
managerial changes occurred after a change in family head.  Second, these results suggest 
that family heads on average play the role of turnaround artist instead of expropriator.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
In conclusion, our paper suggests that family involvement in management is value-
creating, and that analyses of family involvement and family performance need to control   13
more for the dynamic nature of family involvement.  Changes in family head can lead to 
governance improvement, rather than inheritance by a dumb heir.  Over time, the pool of 
available family talent is not only larger, but also potentially more stocked with high-
quality human capital.  Family heads on average seem to be more motivated by turning 
around the lower-performing firms in their portfolio  than in being expropriators.  Over 
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[2] Cumulative Number of Changes in Group Head 
(or firm head in case of independent firms) 0.200 0.457 0.000 0.000 3.000 23015
[3] Group head holds senior management position 
in this firm (or controlling shareholder holds senior 
management position in case of independent firms) 0.699 0.459 1.000 0.000 1.000 23015
[4] Leverage (Total Liabilities/Total Assets) 0.731 0.381 0.723 0.000 8.410 23015
[5] Size (Log of Total Assets) 17.518 1.602 17.307 10.780 24.392 23015
[6] Advertising Intensity (Advertising 
Expenditures/Total Sales) 0.015 0.282 0.001 0.000 37.252 23015
[7] Export Orientation (Export Sales/Total Sales) 0.034 0.144 0.000 0.000 1.000 23015
[8] Firm Is Affiliated with a Business Group            
(Yes =1; 0 otherwise) 0.801 0.399 1.000 0.000 1.000 23015
[9] Firm's Number of Group Affiliates 19.176 25.625 7.000 0.000 91.000 23015Table 2. Correlation Table
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
[1] ROA (Operating Income/Total Assets 1.000
[2] Cumulative Number of Changes in 
Group Head (or firm head in case of 
independent firms) -0.030*** 1.000
[3] Group head holds senior management 
position in this firm (or controlling 
shareholder holds senior management 
position in case of independent firms) 0.040*** 0.003 1.000
[4] Leverage (Total Liabilities/Total 
Assets) -0.231*** -0.022*** -0.035*** 1.000
[5] Size (Log of Total Assets) 0.010 0.199*** -0.046*** -0.026*** 1.000
[6] Advertising Intensity (Advertising 
Expenditures/Total Sales) -0.037*** 0.012* 0.001 -0.015** -0.008 1.000
[7] Export Orientation (Export Sales/Total 
Sales) 0.017** -0.021*** 0.021*** -0.057*** 0.060*** -0.009 1.000
[8] Firm Is Affiliated with a Business 
Group (Yes =1; 0 otherwise) -0.011* 0.139*** 0.159*** 0.055*** 0.152*** 0.002 -0.049*** 1
[9] Firm's Number of Group Affiliates -0.031*** 0.295*** -0.055*** 0.019*** 0.294*** 0.000 -0.043*** 0.361*** 1.000
Note: * = significance at the .10 level, ** = significance at the .05 level, and *** = significance at the .01 levelTable 3. Family Involvement and Profitability
The tables presents results of a fixed-effects specification in which ROA (operating income/total assets) is the dependent variable.  Standard
errors are reported below each coefficient.
DV: ROA (Operating Income/Total Assets)
Model Number
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cumulative Number of Changes in Group Head (or firm head in 
case of independent firms) 0.005 ** 0.005 ** 0.005 ** 0.005 **
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Group head holds senior management position in this firm (or 
controlling shareholder holds senior management position in 
case of independent firms) 0.016 *** 0.016 *** 0.019 *** 0.019 ***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Leverage (Total Liabilities/Total Assets) -0.052 *** -0.054 *** -0.054 *** -0.054 *** -0.054 ***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Size (Log of Total Assets) -0.011 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 ***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Advertising Intensity (Advertising Expenditures/Total Sales) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Export Orientation (Export Sales/Total Sales) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Firm Is Affiliated with a Business Group (Yes =1; 0 otherwise) -0.023 *
[0.013]
Firm's Number of Group Affiliates -0.009 **
[0.004]
Firm Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Included No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Joint p-value of Year Fixed Effects 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 23015 23015 23015 23015 23015
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.036 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052
Note: * = significance at the .10 level, ** = significance at the .05 level, and *** = significance at the .01 levelTable 4. Family Heads and Testing the Turnaround Hypothesis
The tables presents results of a fixed-effects specification in which ROA (operating income/total assets) is the dependent variable.  Standard
errors are reported below each coefficient.
DV: ROA (Operating Income/Total Assets)
Model Number
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Group head holds senior management position in this firm (or 
controlling shareholder holds senior management position in 
case of independent firms) 0.019 *** 0.004 *** 0.015 **** 0.019 *** 0.017 *** 0.016 *** 0.010 **
[0.004] [0.011] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004]
One-year-lagged Firm ROA (Operating Income/Total Assets) 0.416 *** 0.347 ***
[0.006] [0.009]
Two-year-lagged Firm ROA (Operating Income/Total Assets) 0.126 *** -0.011
[0.007] [0.009]
Three-year-lagged Firm ROA (Operating Income/Total Assets) -0.013 * -0.020 **
[0.008] [0.009]
Four-year-lagged Firm ROA (Operating Income/Total Assets) -0.075 *** -0.046 ***
[0.008] [0.009]
Five-year-lagged Firm ROA (Operating Income/Total Assets) -0.063 *** -0.004
[0.008] [0.009]
Cumulative Number of Changes in Group Head (or firm head 
in case of independent firms) 0.005 ** 0.005 *** 0.006 *** 0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.000
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Leverage (Total Liabilities/Total Assets) -0.054 *** -0.033 *** -0.052 *** -0.057 *** -0.057 *** -0.055 *** -0.038 ***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 0.002 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Size (Log of Total Assets) -0.005 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.003 ** 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Advertising Intensity (Advertising Expenditures/Total Sales) -0.003 -0.005 ** -0.004 -0.232 *** -0.220 *** -0.237 *** -0.214 ***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.029] [0.034] [0.038] [0.036]
Export Orientation (Export Sales/Total Sales) -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Firm's Number of Group Affiliates -0.009 ** -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 0.001
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Firm Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Joint p-value of Year Fixed Effects 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 23015 20682 18634 16772 15038 13429 12977
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.052 0.208 0.096 0.084 0.086 0.084 0.207
Note: * = significance at the .10 level, ** = significance at the .05 level, and *** = significance at the .01 levelTable 5. A Further Test of the Turnaround Hypothesis
The tables presents results of a fixed-effects specification in which ROA (operating income/total assets) is the dependent variable.  Standard
errors are reported below each coefficient.
DV: ROA (Operating Income/Total Assets)
Model Number
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Group head holds senior management position in this firm 
(or controlling shareholder holds senior management 
position in case of independent firms) 0.019 *** 0.022 ***
[0.004] [0.006]
One-year-lagged Group head holds senior management 
position in this firm (or controlling shareholder holds senior 
management position in case of independent firms) 0.008 *** 0.006
[0.003] [0.005]
Two-year-lagged Group head holds senior management 
position in this firm (or controlling shareholder holds senior 
management position in case of independent firms) -0.001 -0.005
[0.003] [0.004]
Three-year-lagged Group head holds senior management 
position in this firm (or controlling shareholder holds senior 
management position in case of independent firms) -0.007 *** -0.005
[0.003] [0.004]
Four-year-lagged Group head holds senior management 
position in this firm (or controlling shareholder holds senior 
management position in case of independent firms) -0.012 *** -0.002
[0.003] [0.004]
Five-year-lagged Group head holds senior management 
position in this firm (or controlling shareholder holds senior 
management position in case of independent firms) -0.016 *** -0.012 ***
[0.003] [0.003]
Cumulative Number of Changes in Group Head (or firm 
head in case of independent firms) 0.005 ** 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.011 *** 0.010 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 ***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Leverage (Total Liabilities/Total Assets) -0.054 *** -0.054 *** -0.055 *** -0.055 *** -0.056 *** -0.058 *** -0.058 ***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Size (Log of Total Assets) -0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Advertising Intensity (Advertising Expenditures/Total Sales) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Export Orientation (Export Sales/Total Sales) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Firm's Number of Group Affiliates -0.009 ** -0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.006
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005]
Firm Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Joint p-value of Year Fixed Effects 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 23015 22234 21375 20446 19453 18414 18414
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.052 0.063 0.061 0.058 0.054 0.056 0.057
Note: * = significance at the .10 level, ** = significance at the .05 level, and *** = significance at the .01 levelTable 6. A Final Test of the Turnaround Hypothesis
The tables presents results of a fixed-effects specification in which ROA (operating income/total assets) is the dependent variable.  Standard
errors are reported below each coefficient.
DV: ROA (Operating Income/Total Assets)
Model Number
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
One-year-lagged Firm ROA (Operating Income/Total Assets) 0.416 *** 0.348 ***
[0.006] [0.009]
Two-year-lagged Firm ROA (Operating Income/Total Assets) 0.126 *** -0.011
[0.007] [0.009]
Three-year-lagged Firm ROA (Operating Income/Total Assets) -0.012 -0.020 **
[0.008] [0.009]
Four-year-lagged Firm ROA (Operating Income/Total Assets) -0.074 *** -0.046 ***
[0.008] [0.009]
Five-year-lagged Firm ROA (Operating Income/Total Assets) -0.062 *** -0.004
[0.008] [0.009]
One-year-lagged Group head holds senior management position in this firm 
(or controlling shareholder holds senior management position in case of 
independent firms) 0.014 *** 0.001
[0.004] [0.006]
Two-year-lagged Group head holds senior management position in this firm 
(or controlling shareholder holds senior management position in case of 
independent firms) 0.016 *** 0.014 *
[0.004] [0.007]
Three-year-lagged Group head holds senior management position in this firm
(or controlling shareholder holds senior management position in case of 
independent firms) 0.009 * -0.003
[0.005] [0.006]
Four-year-lagged Group head holds senior management position in this firm 
(or controlling shareholder holds senior management position in case of 
independent firms) 0.005 -0.001
[0.005] [0.006]
Five-year-lagged Group head holds senior management position in this firm 
(or controlling shareholder holds senior management position in case of 
independent firms) 0.003 -0.004
[0.005] [0.006]
Cumulative Number of Changes in Group Head (or firm head in case of 
independent firms) 0.005 *** 0.006 *** 0.004 * 0.002 0.000 0.000
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Leverage (Total Liabilities/Total Assets) -0.033 *** -0.052 *** -0.057 *** -0.057 *** -0.054 *** -0.038 ***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Size (Log of Total Assets) -0.003 *** -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.004 ** 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Advertising Intensity (Advertising Expenditures/Total Sales) -0.005 ** -0.004 -0.233 *** -0.220 ** -0.237 *** -0.214 ***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.029] [0.034] [0.038] [0.036]
Export Orientation (Export Sales/Total Sales) -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Firm's Number of Group Affiliates -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Firm Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Joint p-value of Year Fixed Effects 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 20682 18634 16772 15038 13429 12977
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.243 0.096 0.084 0.085 0.083 0.208
Note: * = significance at the .10 level, ** = significance at the .05 level, and *** = significance at the .01 level